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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CONNIE LEE ROBERTS
f/k/a CONNIE LEE DONITHORNE

Case No. 890347-CA

Plain tiff-Respondent
vs.
DENNIS DuWAYNE DONITHORNE

Category No. 7

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
The

Court

of Appeals

has appellate jurisdiction

over

this

domestic

relations matter pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(g).
NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgement of the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which 1) the Court included
a provision that the Appellant not harass the Respondent when telephoning the
minor children, 2)
in

any

of the

Appellant was ordered by the lower court not to participate

special

activities

of the

parties children,

Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees.

2

and

3)

ordered

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
If A). Did the trial court err when it failed to make any findings of fact
or conclusions of law relative to the issue of including a provision

that

Appellant's not harass Respondent when telephoning the minor children?
(B). Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court err
when

it

included

in

its

order

a

provision

that

Appellant's

not

harass

Did the trial court err when it failed to make any

findings

Respondent when telephoning the minor children?

11(A).

of fact or conclusions of law relative to the issue of restricting Appellant from
participating in any of the children's special activities?
(B). Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court err
when it restricted Appellant from participating in any of the children's special
activities?

III(A).Did the trial court err when it failed to make any findings of fact
or conclusions of law relative to the issue of Appellant paying Respondent's
attorney's fees?
(B).

Given the facts known to the trial court, did the trial court

err when it ordered Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney's fees?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from a final Order and Judgement entered after a
trial in the Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park presiding, in which the
lower court 1) included a provision in its order that Appellant not harass
Respondent

when

telephoning

the parties

minor children,

2) ordered

that

Appellant not participate in the special activities of the minor children, and 3)
ordered Appellant to pay Respondent's attorney fees.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

A Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage was originally issued by the
Superior Court of California in the County of Contra Costa on April 15, 1986
and custody of the minor children awarded to Respondent.

Respondent filed

a Petition to Reduce Foreign Decree to Judgment in January,
Fourth

1988 in the

District Court of the State of Utah and Appellant filed there

an

Answer and a Counter Claim in February, 1988 alleging a substantial change
of circumstances and that custody be awarded to him.

Appellant filed an

Order to Show Cause for a specific visitation schedule in September, 1988 and
moved to Utah in October, 1988.

Respondent filed an Amended Petition to

Reduce Foreign Decree to Judgment in December, 1988 through new counsel.
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A pre-trial
jurisdiction.

hearing

A trial

was

was
held

held on
on

April

February

29,
7,

1988 on the
1989 on

the

issue of
issues

of

Respondent's Amended Petition and Appellant's Motion for a specific visitation
schedule.
C.

Lower Court Disposition.

At the pre-trial hearing the court found it had jurisdiction over the
issues of custody and visitation but deferred to California the issues of child
support and alimony.
At trial on February
ongoing child support.

7, 1989 the court found jurisdiction to award

On the 29th of April, 1989, the trial court entered an

Order and Judgment in which it ruled that,
The Defendant is entitled to telephone visitation
with the minor children which conversation shall not
exceed 15 minutes and there shall be no harassment of
the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff is to advise the Defendant as to
any special activities that the children are involved
in but he is not to participate in those activities
but has the right to observe them.
Plaintiff is granted judgment against the Defendant
in the sum of $1,800.00 representing a reasonable
attorney's fee incurred in this matter.
///
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Defendant was ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $293.00 per month
as

ongoing

child

support

based

on

the

Child

Support

Guidelines

and

Defendant's request for extended visitation was reserved by the court pending
his showing evidence to the court of a compatible work schedule.
No Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law were prepared pursuant to
this Decision.

D.

This appeal ensued on the orders quoted above.

Statement of Facts.

The parties in this matter were married on December 30, 1976.
children,

Ryan

Tully

Donithorne,

born

July

28,

1980, and

Jason

Donithorne, born November 8, 1982, were born as issue of this marriage.
parties separated in April, 1985.

Two
David
The

A judgment of dissolution of marriage was

entered on April 15, 1986 by the Superior Court of California in the County
of Contra Costa and custody of the minor children awarded to Respondent.
Respondent secretly relocated with the children to Utah in May of 1985,
one month following their separation and prior to even any temporary order
of custody being granted her. Subsequent to the parties separation Appellant
was refused any visitation with the children by Respondent, except during a
brief afternoon while Respondent and the children returned to California for a
meeting with Contra Costa County mediation personnel.
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Such visitation was

only permitted under the supervision of Respondent and her sister-in-law, Becky
Roberts, who traveled from Utah with her.
The

judgment

of dissolution

entered

on

April

15,

1986,

provided

Appellant the right of reasonable visitation and specifically included four weeks
during the summer of 1986 and one-half of Christmas vacation, Thanksgiving
and spring break during odd years to Appellant.

Notwithstanding said order,

Respondent refused to allow Appellant any visitation whatsoever for a period
of approximately three years.

The first opportunity Appellant was next given

to visit the children was during his four day stay in Utah as ordered by
Judge Boyd L. Park at pre-trial hearing on April 29, 1988.
During the numerous approximate weekly attempts by Appellant to speak
with the children by telephone during the previous three years

Respondent

refused to allow Appellant to speak with the children more than once per
month.

To overcome this problem, Judge Park specifically ordered at the pre-

trial hearing that Appellant have unlimited telephone contact with the children.
No provision that there be no harassment of Respondent when

Appellant

telephoned the children was included in the pre-trial order.
For

the

first

time

since

the

parties

separation,

Appellant

enjoyed

visitation with the children under the same pre-trial order for a period of six
weeks with the children the following summer.
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Due to Appellants desire to spend more time with his children on a
regular basis and be actively involved in their lives as he had been prior to
the parties separation, he elected to relocate to Pleasant Grove, Utah in
October, 1988.

A hearing on Appellant's Order to Show Cause was convened

on October 20, 1988 on his motion for extended visitation during the regular
days and times Respondent was working during the evening.

Domestic

relations commissioner, Howard Maetani, restricted Appellant's telephone contact
with the children to once per week.

Appellant objected to the commissioner's

recommendation and Judge Park reinstated Appellants desire for as much as
daily telephone contact with the children at trial on February 7, 1989.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT
POINT I -- THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UPON WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT INCLUDED AN
UNNECESSARY PROVISION THAT THERE BE NO HARASSMENT
OF PLAINTIFF WHEN DEFENDANT TELEPHONES THE MINOR
CHILDREN AND FURTHER ERRED IN ISSUING ITS RULING
CONTAINING SUCH PROVISION.
The heart and core of Appellant's appeal, and his central concern, is that
the trial court failed wholely to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law whatsoever which evidence the thought and reasoning process of the trial
court.
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Underlying the Appellant's position is this notion:

A person has a right

to know the process bv which the court considered the evidence and formed
conclusions from the evidence.

It is the function of the trial court to make

findings of fact to reveal the court's thought process.

A litigant has the "right

to know" the process by which the court considered the evidence and the
points of law and formed its conclusions based thereon.
On

this

point

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

ruled

in

Christiansen

v.

Christiansen. 667 P.2d 592 in citing Chandler v. W e s t 610 P.2d 1299, 1301
(Utah, 1980) as follows:
The making of formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law, whether the motion is granted
or denied, materially assists the parties in
determining whether there may be a basis for appeal,
and if an appeal is taken, significantly assists
this court in its review.
On this same point the Utah Supreme Court later ruled in Pennington
b. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254 lUtah, 1985),
We acknowledge that the findings are meager, and
strongly advise respondent's attorney, who drafted
them, to take the necessary effort in the future to
prepare more specific and substantive findings.
We cannot overemphasize the importance of well
written findings to support modifications of
divorce decrees. See Tuckev v, Tuckev, Utah,
649 P.2d 88 (1982). "One of the reasons for
this requirement is to explain the basis for the
modification so the aggrieved party can determine
whether to challenge it and so the appellate court
9

can properly review it on appeal." Shioii v. Shioii.
Utah, 671 P.2d 135, 136 (1983). Conclusory findings
give little indication of the trial court's reasons
for reaching its result. Such findings may invite
unnecessary expensive appeals which in turn delay
final resolution of the issues and impede judicial
economy.
In the case of Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 58 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah,
1987), the Utah Supreme Court repeated the principles under which a trial
court's findings of fact are deemed sufficient.

In Acton, the court ruled,

The findings of fact must show that the court's
judgment or decree follows logically from and is
supported by, the evidence.' The findings should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"
(Citing Smith v. Smith, at 426 and Rucker v. Dalton,
598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah, 1979).
We do not mean that the trial court was incorrect,
but only that the issues are for the trial court to
decide and that the findings of fact must reveal how
the court resolved each material issue.... Acton at 9
In

Acton,

the

Court

concluded

that

the

finding

therein

inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of proper

had

been

findings.

In Smith, it was held by the Utah Supreme Court that the findings of
fact rendered by the trial court,
[Did] not pass muster since
a rational factual basis for the
pertinent factors that relate to
including specific attributes of
(Emphasis added.)

they simply [did] not demonstrate
ultimate decision by reference to
the best interest of the child,
the parents.
Smith, at 426.
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Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that
In all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon,...It will be sufficient if the findings
of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence.
Nevertheless, in this case the trial court made no finding of facts or
conclusions of law either
concerning

the

evidence

in its written
presented

relative

order or in its oral
to the

necessity

statements

of the

court

including a provision in its order that there be no harassment of Plaintiff
when Defendant telephones the minor children.
The record is void of any proof whatsoever that Defendant has ever
harassed Plaintiff in any way, notwithstanding her allegations to that effect
contained in her initial Petition.
Defendant categorically denied in Paragraph 7 of his Answer to Plaintiffs
initial Petition that any such harassment had ever occurred.

Defendant further

provided evidence in Paragraphs 2 & 3 of his Affirmative Defenses portion of
his Answer that said allegations are sham pleas.
Subsequently

Defendant

filed

a

counter-claim

to

Plaintiffs

wherein he again addressed the issue of telephone harassment.

petition,

In Paragraph

20 of his First Claim regarding interference with visitation and in Paragraph
8 of his Second Claim regarding a substantial change of circumstances
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warranting the change of custody, Defendant further supported his denial of
harassment.
Notwithstanding Defendant's categorical denial of making harassing phone
calls Plaintiff

reiterated such allegations in Paragraph

Petition filed by new counsel.

9 of her

Amended

In addition, Plaintiff again falsely alleged t h a t

Defendant had molested her in the same paragraph, yet provided no evidence
at trial of such concoction on her part.

POINT II ~ THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON
WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT TO
PARTICIPATE IN HIS CHILDREN'S SPECIAL ACTIVITIES AND
FURTHER ERRED IN ISSUING SUCH RULING.

All of the above arguments relative to the importance of the trial court
making findings of fact and conclusions of law apply equally to this second
issue.
The record is silent as to any justification for restricting Appellant from
participating in his children's special activities.

Further, the trial court's order

t h a t Appellant is permitted to attend but not participate in his children's
special activities is impractical.

When he has gone to such activities he has

been approached by others in attendance to engage in conversation and
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participation which is difficult to refuse unless he is to be esteemed as antisocial.

To justify seemingly anti-social behavior he would be forced to refer to

the order precluding such participation obtained by Respondent, which he would
prefer not to do lest it be interpreted as publicly disparaging the character of
Respondent.

POINT III - THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACT OR CONCLUSIONS OF LAW UPON
WHICH TO BASE ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT IS TO PAY
RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEYS FEES AND FURTHER ERRED IN
ISSUING ITS RULING THAT APPELLANT PAY THE SAME.

All of the arguments under Point I relative to the importance of the
trial court making findings of fact and conclusions of law apply equally to this
third issue.
In Asper v. Aspen 81 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (5/4/88) the Utah Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to make a specific finding of
need before an award of attorney's fees could be determined,

where

the

plaintiff wife sought an award of attorney's fees.
Plaintiff did not show that her attorney's fees are reasonable.

In Beals

v. Beals» 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984), the Supreme Court of Utah ruled,
In divorce cases, awards of attorney's fees must be supported
by evidence which shows that the requested award is reasonable.
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In rendering its decision to reverse an award of attorney's fees in Beads,
the court quoted its earlier decision in Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah,
1980) saying that, "Relevant factors of reasonableness include

the necessity of

the number of hours dedicated'."
Plaintiffs counsel, failed to proffer at trial evidence of any kind as to
"the necessity of the number of hours dedicated."
Further, at no time during trial did Plaintiff allege that she was in
financial

need of her attorney's fees being awarded.

The trial

record is

completely devoid of testimony by Plaintiff that she had inadequate resources
to pay her own attorney's fees.
In Beals (supra), the Utah Supreme Court also said,
"...the party requesting the award must show financial
need...Where reasonableness of the award or financial need have
not been shown, we have reversed awards of attorney's fees."
The same court ruled in Kallas v. Kallas. 614 P.2d 641 (Utah, 1980),
that,
...a proper determination of whether fees should be awarded
and the amount, if any, cannot be made without an examination
of the facts...Because there was no presentation of facts establishing
defendants financial need accompanying the motion the award was
inadequately supported.
The decision of the trial court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for reconsideration by the trial court in light of this
opinion.
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Plaintiffs counsel has demonstrated a lack of the requisite integrity to
entitle Plaintiff to attorney's fees.
In Kerr (supra), the court noted that,
Inasmuch as this case is remanded for further proceedings,
we deem it appropriate to make some observations about the
method of proof of the value of attorneys' services.

It is neither practical nor productive for the profession or for
the public, to present the impression that compensation for a
lawyer's services can always be gauged on a scale of dollars per
hour.
Perhaps this can be done as to many of the perfunctory
services a lawyer performs, but his services in other areas may run
the gamut of the complexities of the human condition.

The choice of a lawyer, and the value of his services, may
depend upon a number of factors, including his background of
learning and experience, his ability, his integrity (emphasis added)
and his dedication to the causes with which he identifies himself.
Plaintiffs
purposely

and

counsel has on two past occasions defrauded

the court by

knowingly

condition

misrepresenting

Plaintiffs

financial

by

alleging that she was "working at three job simultaneously," when if fact, he
knew or had reason to believe otherwise.

The two occasions were, first, at an

Order to Show Cause hearing brought by Defendant regarding visitation before
Commissioner Maetani on October 20, 1988 and second, at a hearing held on
the Friday after Thanksgiving before Judge Boyd Park regarding visitation.
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On both these occasions he testified that Plaintiff was in fact working three
jobs simultaneously just to support herself and the children.
The gist of his argument was to influence the court on both occasions
not to grant the visitation sought by Defendant under the allegation

that

Plaintiff was only unavailable to the children during the visitation times sought
by

Defendant

because of her having the work three jobs to support

the

children.

Such a misrepresentation by Plaintiffs counsel was simply a lie and

Plaintiffs

counsel knew or should have known at the time he made said

misrepresentation that it was a lie.
Plaintiff
argumentative

counsel's

reputation

when in court, and

for

being

uncooperative

unnecessarily

litigious,

in negotiating

settlement

supports that the award of attorney's fees be reversed.
In Kerr,

(supra) the

Utah Supreme Court noted that,

"Also to be

considered,11 in deciding an award of attorney's fees, "is the reputation he [or
she] has acquired,..." (emphasis added).
The reputation of Plaintiffs counsel among his peers supports that he is
extremely difficult to work with.

He is well known for being unnecessarily

litigious, argumentative in court when examining and cross-examining witnesses,
and especially uncooperative in making efforts to negotiate settlement of the
issues between opposing parties.

He rather

litigation skills of advocacy.
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prides himself regarding

his

Defendant has repeatedly suggested to Plaintiffs counsel that both parties
best interest and those of the children would be best served by an attempt by
both sides to negotiate the settlement of the numerous issues on which they
are opposed.

Plaintiffs

counsel has consistently refused

to negotiate with

Defendant, preferring instead to unnecessarily occupy the court's time to resolve
many small matters which likely could have been voluntarily worked out better
between the parties to everyone's best interest other than Plaintiff counsel's
own financial interest.
The

Kerr case further

does not support

the

reasonableness

of the

necessity of the number of hours Plaintiffs counsel alleges to have dedicated
to achieve the results obtained for Plaintiff at trial.
Well in advance of the trial Defendant wrote Plaintiffs counsel and made
a proposal for settlement regarding the issues heard at trial on February 7,
1989.

Although counsel alleged that he would submit the proposal to Plaintiff,

such was not done.
counsel

made

Notwithstanding counsel's promise to submit the proposal

no effort

whatsoever

to

respond

on

behalf of Plaintiff

to

Defendant's proposal, preferring instead to employ his legal prowess at trial.
Further, when Plaintiffs counsel proffered testimony as to the number
of hours he had spent, there was no indication that the 20 hours allegedly
spent, were spent specifically on the issues heard at trial that day.
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In fact,

Defendant rather believes that Plaintiffs counsel simply cited the total number
of hours he and supposedly spent on the case to date, as though all the time
spent and been relevant to the issues argues that day.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the deference which the Court of Appeals gives to the
trial court in family law matters,
where findings of fact
to review

The Court of Appeals is free, especially

and conclusions of law as absent in the trial record,

questions of law and

fact

and

to make

findings

of its

own.

Pennington v. Pennington. 711 P.2d 254, 257 (Utah, 1985).
In

Acton, the

Court

concluded

that

the

findings

therein

had

been

inadequate and that the case should be remanded for entry of proper findings.
Wherefore, Appellant seeks that this case be so remanded.

In the

alternative, Appellant request the Court of Appeals make findings of its own
based upon the evidence in the record.
The record sustains that there is no need that there be a provision t h a t
Appellant

not

harass

Respondent

during

telephone conversations

with

the

children.
Further,

the

record

sustains

that

there

is

no

reason

to

Appellant from participating in the special activities of the children.
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preclude

And last the record does not support that Appellant be required to pay
Respondent's attorney's fees neither at the trial level or on this

appeal.

Appellant does not have the financial resources to hire an attorney at either
level.

He has spent approximately 85 hours in preparing this brief.

He has

lost the opportunity to be otherwise gainfully employed during the 85 hours
he has spent to prepare it.

It is certainly appropriate that Respondent bear

her own legal costs in responding thereto.
\
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